The US Has a Plan. We Have… What Exactly?

In January 2026, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security announced a new Program Executive Office for UAS and Counter-UAS, backed by $115 million for counter-drone technologies. This followed President Trump’s June 2025 executive orders establishing a comprehensive national drone strategy. Meanwhile, in southern Alberta, the Foremost UAS Test Range—one of only two sites in Canada approved for beyond visual line of sight testing—sits idle because no level of government can find $200,000 per year to keep it operational.

This contrast is striking. Canada has 116,304 registered drones, 128,888 Basic Pilot Certificate holders, and 20,138 Advanced pilots as of December 2025. New Level 1 Complex BVLOS operations launched in November, with 249 pilots already certified and 368 active RPAS Operator Certificates issued. Yet despite this growing industry, Canada lacks any coherent national vision for drone development and security.

The American Approach

President Trump’s “Unleashing American Drone Dominance” executive order represents something Canada simply does not have: a comprehensive strategy integrating commercial development, national security, and regulatory reform with specific timelines. The FAA was directed to issue proposed BVLOS rules within 30 days and establish clear performance metrics. The companion “Restoring American Airspace Sovereignty” order addresses counter-drone challenges with a Federal Task Force, a $1.5 billion contract vehicle for acquisitions, and $250 million in FEMA grants to World Cup host states.

The scale of commitment is staggering. DHS alone is investing nearly $2 billion in drone and counter-drone capabilities, while domestic manufacturing receives explicit prioritization and export support through multiple federal agencies.

Canada’s Patchwork Approach

Canada has Transport Canada’s “Drone Strategy to 2025,” released in March 2021. As observers in The Globe and Mail noted, this strategy “was developed largely in isolation from national security considerations,” missing opportunities for coordination across agencies increasingly relying on drones.

Canadian investments are scattered and reactive. The government announced $46 million for counter-drone equipment in 2024—but only for CAF members deployed in Latvia, not domestic security. The $2.49 billion MQ-9B Reaper acquisition won’t be fully operational until 2033. Meanwhile, the Department of National Defence conducted counter-drone detection trials in Ottawa in November 2025, but without any coordinating framework equivalent to American executive orders.

The Foremost Failure

Nothing illustrates Canada’s lack of strategy more starkly than the Foremost UAS Test Range. This southern Alberta facility offers 2,400 square kilometres of restricted airspace—nearly four times the size of Banff National Park. The team spent eight years navigating approvals with Transport Canada, NAV Canada, and dozens of landowners. As NAV Canada’s Director of RPAS Traffic Management noted, “Foremost really provided the backbone for the testing capabilities that went into being able to develop the new regulations.”

Yet when funding expired in September 2025, the range closed. The cost to keep it operational? Approximately $200,000 per year—less than one-tenth of one percent of what the U.S. committed to counter-drone technology for the World Cup alone. Transport Canada did not respond to questions about funding. Alberta’s Ministry of Technology and Innovation would not comment on future support.

Strategic Implications

With 1,328 Flight Reviewers, 269 self-declared drone flight schools (including 68 Level 1 Complex training providers), and a market projected to reach nearly $10 billion by 2030, Canada has a substantial drone ecosystem. But companies requiring BVLOS testing now have essentially one option—the more limited Alma, Quebec facility—or they can take their innovation south of the border.

The security implications extend beyond commercial testing. Russia tracked more than 1,000 suspicious drone flights over Germany in 2025. Canada’s vast Arctic territory and lengthy coastlines represent surveillance challenges that drone technology is uniquely positioned to address. Lieutenant-General Michael Wright has said the CAF should be able to “flood the zone” with drones in future conflicts—but Canada has no equivalent to the American strategic urgency.

Conclusion

The United States has presidential executive orders, billions in funding, coordinated federal offices, and clear timelines. Canada has a four-year-old strategy focused narrowly on civil aviation and an inability to find $200,000 to keep a world-class test facility operational. The Foremost test range, sitting idle for want of modest funding, should concern every Canadian operator, manufacturer, and policymaker.