Transport Canada Warned Civil Air Operators About GPS Jamming in 2024. Its BVLOS Knowledge Standard Still Does Not Mention It.

In August 2026, NATO scrambled four fighter jets before dawn and shot down an unidentified drone that had crossed into eastern Latvia. The Latvian military attributed the incursion to Russian “electromagnetic warfare.” Col. David Brassard, the Canadian commander of NATO’s Multinational Brigade in Latvia, told The Canadian Press that some drones crossing into Latvia were reportedly Ukrainian drones diverted by Russian jamming. The question this raises for Canadian civil BVLOS operators is straightforward: does the knowledge standard that governs their certification address deliberate GNSS interference?

What Transport Canada’s Safety Alert Actually Says

On October 10, 2024, Transport Canada issued Civil Aviation Safety Alert CASA 2024-10, Issue No. 01, addressed to all Canadian private and commercial air operators utilizing GPS/GNSS navigation services. Its purpose, in Transport Canada’s own words, was “to provide guidance to civil air operators with regards to GPS/GNSS interference as it relates to instances of jamming and spoofing.” The alert defined both threats precisely: jamming uses radio frequency interference to intentionally prevent air navigation systems from receiving data, while spoofing simulates a GPS signal to feed an aircraft incorrect positioning, navigation, and timing data. Transport Canada identified conflict regions where GPS/GNSS interference had been commonly reported, including the Black Sea area, the Baltic Sea area, the eastern Mediterranean area, and the Middle East. The CASA page was last modified October 6, 2025, and the document remains Issue No. 01. The alert was written with crewed aircraft in mind: the warning signs it lists involve flight management systems, inertial reference systems and terrain warning alerts, and its recommended actions apply to operators flying in those regions. It does not mention RPAS.

What the Level 1 Complex Knowledge Standard Covers — and Where It Stops

TP 15530 serves as the ground training and examination guide for pilots of Remotely Piloted Aircraft in Level 1 Complex operations, as outlined in Part IX of the Canadian Aviation Regulations. The standard does cover meaningful GNSS and radio-frequency ground: it requires pilots to describe signal limitations caused by the flight environment and geography, and the effect of solar activity on GNSS signals. It requires them to describe effects on a flight within locations that may have effects on GPS reception and impose limitations on autopilots. It asks them to assess and predict the impact the radio frequency environment may have on the operation. It addresses lost link and methods of recovery and contingencies. It requires identification of potential sources of EMI in a RPAS operating environment, including the K index, and the effect of harmonic radiation on radio signals. These are not trivial requirements. But when TP 15530 was opened in full on October 23, 2026, it did not contain the words jamming, spoofing, or electronic warfare. The word interference appears only in the EMI section and the C2 link section — not in the context of deliberate or hostile interference with GNSS. The gap is specific: the standard covers naturally occurring and incidental signal degradation, but the threat named in Transport Canada’s own 2024 safety alert — intentional, adversarial manipulation of GNSS — is absent from the document. The radio frequency environment objective is broad, but it sits in the C2 link section and deals with link performance; nothing in the standard asks a pilot to recognize a GNSS position being jammed or spoofed, or what to do when it happens. Transport Canada’s August 2026 Drone Zone newsletter reminds drone pilots that understanding NOTAMs, including GPS NOTAMs, is a knowledge requirement, but it does not mention jamming or spoofing either. As of August 13, 2026, Transport Canada had issued 709 Level 1 Complex pilot certificates, and 615 RPAS Operator Certificates were active. The 709 figure is a cumulative count of certificates issued, not a count of active pilots, and RPOCs belong to operators rather than individual pilots. Searches covering 2024 through October 2026 found no Transport Canada exemption order, advisory circular, pilot notice, or Canada Gazette amendment addressing deliberate GPS/GNSS jamming or spoofing specifically for RPAS pilots. The TP 15530 page was last modified April 1, 2025 — approximately 24 months have elapsed since CASA 2024-10 took effect, and the knowledge standard has not been updated to include jamming or spoofing in that period.

A Standard Built for Yesterday’s Signal Environment

EASA updated its Safety Information Bulletin on GNSS interference to Revision 4 on July 3, 2026, following analysis of recent jamming and spoofing occurrences and building on work from a dedicated joint EASA-EUROCONTROL task force on GNSS interference. Canadian troops training in Latvia in May 2026 were already working alongside first-person view attack drones and drone jamming technology in a force-on-force exercise within NATO Multinational Brigade Latvia’s training area. That training context is military — Canadian Armed Forces operations run under National Defence authority, not under Transport Canada’s Level 1 Complex pathway. Civil commercial operators, civil government agencies, and police services flying civil-registered aircraft operate under a different framework entirely. Transport Canada published a proposed regulatory amendment on June 8, 2026, aimed at safely integrating the growing number of RPAS into Canadian airspace and creating more suitable mechanisms for managing airspace access. Its public consultation closed September 9, 2026. That amendment addresses Remote Identification, community-based organizations, and designated airspace. CASA 2024-10 was aimed at crewed aircraft near foreign conflict zones, not at drones. But the threat it describes matters at least as much to civil BVLOS: an RPA flying a programmed route beyond visual line of sight depends on GNSS for its position, and there is no one on board to notice when that position is wrong. The knowledge standard that civil BVLOS pilots are trained and examined against does not acknowledge the threat Transport Canada Civil Aviation documented in 2024. Should the Level 1 Complex knowledge standard cover jamming and spoofing before civil BVLOS operations scale up?

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